

**DEMANDES DE PRÉCISIONS DES PARTICIPANTS À ELENCHUS RELATIVES À L'ÉTABLISSEMENT
D'UN MÉCANISME DE RÉGLEMENTATION INCITATIVE
ASSURANT LA RÉALISATION DE GAINS D'EFFICIENCE
PAR LE DISTRIBUTEUR D'ÉLECTRICITÉ ET LE TRANSPORTEUR D'ÉLECTRICITÉ**

FCEI (Pièce C-FCEI-0006)

1. **Référence :** Rapport Elenchus, p.46, ligne 15 à 18 et p.67, lignes 13 à 15.

Demande :

- 1.1 Could you provide the references to or the documents referenced showing the details of calculation for the «quantitative measures ».

HQD-HQT (Pièce C-HQT-HQD-0005)

2. **Référence :** Rapport Elenchus, p.46, ligne 15 à 18 et p.67, lignes 13 à 15.

Demande :

- 2.1 Mr. Todd mentioned the creation of a “long list” of PBR programs from which a “short list” of 6 examples was selected for the Elenchus report. Please provide the long list, with any details gathered on these additional programs.

UC (Pièce C-UC-0005)

3. **Référence :** Rapport Elenchus, p.46, ligne 15 à 18 et p.67, lignes 13 à 15.

Préambule :

Page 9, lignes 4 à 7:

« The tailoring of PBR to apply specifically to distributors and transmitters by these regulators is relevant to the issues being addressed by the Régie which is examining regulatory models that could be used for both the Transmission and Distribution divisions of Hydro Quebec. »

Page15, lignes 4 à 8

« Rather it will be necessary to recognize the unique economic and infrastructure characteristics of each utility and each jurisdiction in order to determine how to implement the guiding principles to performance based, or incentive, regulation that will be effective in achieving the specific objectives that the regulator is pursuing. »

Demande :

- 3.1 Do you know of jurisdictions where a distributor and a transmission provider would be under the same PBR?
- 3.2 If you do could you please give the references?

Préambule :

Page 45, lignes 21 à 24:

« However, in April 2007, the NYPSC directed all public utilities to “develop and implement mechanisms that true-up forecast and actual delivery service revenues and, as a result, significantly reduce or eliminate any disincentive caused by the recovery of utility fixed delivery costs via volumetric rates or marginal consumption blocks. »

Demande :

- 3.3 Could you please elaborate a bit more on those «mechanism with true-up» and what they should actually achieve? (Régie requires to provide references only)

RNCREQ (Pièce C-RNCREQ-0006)

4. **Référence :** Rapport Elenchus, p.46, ligne 15 à 18 et p.67, lignes 13 à 15.

Préambule :

Ontario

Reference p. A-18 - text below the table (English Report)

« *Several distributors have applied under the Custom IR option, including Hydro One Distribution, Toronto Hydro and Horizon Utilities. [...]* ».

Given that Hydro-Québec has more in common with Hydro-One and Toronto Hydro than with Ontario small municipal utilities, we are interested to know more about those custom incentive regulations.

Demande :

- 4.1 Could you please please provide a written summary of the custom incentive about the custom incentive regulations for Hydro-One and Toronto Hydro? (Régie requires to provide references only)

UMQ (Pièce C-UMQ-0007)

5. **Référence :** Rapport Elenchus, p.46, ligne 15 à 18 et p.67, lignes 13 à 15.

Préambule :

Pièce A-0003, p. 19 lignes 25 et ss; p. 20, lignes 1-2 [nous soulignons]

1. Establish a system whereby it is in the utility's interest to be efficient.
 2. *Establish a system that facilitates the comparison of utilities – that is, establish a form of “competition” in service efficiency.*
 3. Separate rates from costs by using external inflation and productivity measures.
- These are three of the key principles underpinning incentive and performance-based regulation.

Demande :

5.1 Le 2e principe ci-haut (**en surligné jaune**) réfère-t-il explicitement au balisage?

SÉ-AQLPA (Pièce C-SÉ-AQLPA-0005)

6. **Référence :** Rapport Elenchus, p.46, ligne 15 à 18 et p.67, lignes 13 à 15.

Préambule :

Pièce A-0003, page 59 (adobe 65), lignes 12-14 (Australia) :

« *Within the term, rates are smoothed using a CPI-X escalator. This mechanism provides an efficiency incentive since variances from the annual allowed revenue are retained by the utility.* » [Bold and underlined by SÉ-AQLPA]

Demande :

6.1 Under the Australian PBR, isn't there any sharing mechanism of variances at the end of the year?

Préambule :

Pièce A-0003, pages A-88 et ss.

6.2 For the record, please provide a definition of the « Y Factor ». It was omitted in your definitions.

AQCIE-CIFQ (Pièce C-AQCIE-CIFQ-0005)

7. Référence : Rapport Elenchus, p.46, ligne 15 à 18 et p.67, lignes 13 à 15.

Demande :

- 7.1 Please confirm that the X factor in the OEB Board's 2nd Generation IR was informed by a survey of studies of the TFP trends of US power distributors.
- 7.2 Please confirm that that the X factor in the ENMAX FBR was informed by a survey of utility productivity trends from around the world including Ontario, the United States, New Zealand, and Victoria, Australia.
- 7.3 Please substantiate your statement on p. 49 that “The incentive regimes implemented by the NYPSC in the past, however, have not included strong efficiency incentives?” Were earnings sharing mechanisms and relatively short plan terms part of the problem?
- 7.4 Please confirm that over the course of Consolidated Edison’s rate plans that the reliability requirements have gotten more detailed and more areas have been incentivized.